At what levels of Financial Development Does Information Sharing Matter? by Asongu, Simplice A. & Nwachukwu, Jacinta Chikaodi
RESEARCH Open Access
At what levels of financial development
does information sharing matter?
Simplice A. Asongu1,2* and Jacinta C. Nwachukwu3
* Correspondence:
asongusimplice@yahoo.com
1African Governance and
Development Institute, P.O. Box
8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon
2Department of Economics,
University of South Africa, P. O. Box
392, Pretoria UNISA 0003, South
Africa
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
Background: The purpose of this study is to investigate how an increase in
information-sharing bureaus affects financial access.
Methods: We employed contemporary and non-contemporary interactive quantile
regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011. Information-sharing
bureaus are proxied with public credit registries and private credit offices. Financial
development dynamics involving depth (at overall economic and financial system
levels), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking and
financial system perspectives), and size are used.
Results: Two key findings are established. First, the effect of an increase in private
credit bureaus is not clearly noticeable on financial access, probably because private
credit agencies are still to be established in many countries. Second, an increase in
public credit registries for the most part improves financial allocation efficiency and
activity (or credit) between the 25th and 75th quartiles.
Conclusions: As a main policy implication, countries in the top and bottom ends of
the financial efficiency and activity distributions are unlikely to benefit from
enhanced financial allocation efficiency as a result of an increase in public credit
registries.
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Background
The purpose of this study is to assess how an increase in information-sharing offices affects
financial access when existing levels of financial development are taken into account. Re-
cent literature reveals that less than 20% of African households have access to financial ser-
vices (see IFAD 2011; Asongu et al. 2017). This widespread narrative indicates that a great
part of the population on the continent depends on the informal sector for financial ser-
vices. Some factors limiting access to finance include low population densities in many
areas, poor facilities in transport, and limited communication infrastructure. In regions
where financial services from the formal sector are available, low-income households and
small businesses are for the most part unable to meet certain basic lending requirements,
like strict documentation and collateral provision. Even in situations where such conditions
are met, cost barriers (like substantial transaction fees) and high minimum deposits of sav-
ings could still overwhelmingly restrict financial access.
Financial Innovation
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The above concerns have led to issues of surplus liquidity or excess cash in African
formal financial institutions (see Saxegaard 2006; Fouda 2009; Asongu 2014a, p. 70).
The authors have suggested measures to curb both the voluntary and involuntary hold-
ing of excess liquidity by banks. First, voluntary holding of excess cash can be reduced
by: (i) helping banks to track their positions at the central bank to prevent them from
keeping reserves above statutory limits; (ii) consolidating institutions that are favorable
to interbank lending; and (iii) improving infrastructure to prevent remote bank
branches from holding excess reserves essentially due to transportation problems. Sec-
ond, involuntary keeping of surplus cash can be kept at minimum by: (i) reducing the
incapacity of banks to lend in scenarios where interest rates are regulated; (ii) creating
conducive conditions for commercial banks to invest surplus liquidity in bond markets;
(iii) increasing investment avenues for regional banks via promotion of regional stock ex-
change markets; and (iv) reducing lending contraction of banks through instruments that
encourage competition and mitigate information asymmetry. This line of inquiry is closest
to the final point (iii) of the first strand, regarding the improvement of infrastructure.
Over the past decade, information-sharing bureaus have been introduced across the Afri-
can continent in order to enhance financial access by limiting information asymmetry. Un-
fortunately, recent empirical literature has been based on the assumption that information-
sharing agencies may not be increasing financial access as theoretically anticipated (see Triki
and Gajigo 2014). For instance, Asongu et al. (2016) concluded that the effects of
information-sharing bureaus have mostly been negative on financial development dynamics
in terms of depth, allocation efficiency, and activity. Moreover, as we shall demonstrate in
the literature review that follows, there has been very limited scholarly focus on the role of
information-sharing agencies on financial access in the African continent.
This study addresses the highlighted gaps by investigating the levels of financial de-
velopment for which an increase in information-sharing bureaus can most enhance fi-
nancial access. The interest in considering initial levels of financial development arises
because the findings of Asongu et al. (2016) were based on the average values of finan-
cial development. It is important to include countries with low, intermediate, and high
levels of financial development in the modeling exercise, because blanket policies based
on the mean values of financial access may not succeed unless they are contingent on
initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with dif-
ferent levels of financial access (see Henderson et al. 2013). In the light of the above in-
sights, the quantile regression empirical strategy is adopted, because existing studies on
information sharing have examined the relationship between information-sharing bur-
eaus and financial development using parameter estimates based on the conditional
means of financial development variables (Triki and Gajigo 2014; Asongu et al. 2016).
The emphasized research gaps are addressed by answering the following question:
can we identify the existing levels of financial development in Africa for which in-
creases in information-sharing bureaus show a strong positive effect on financial ac-
cess? Addressing this research inquiry is important, because the findings should inform
policy makers on ways to lift financial access barriers to enable households and small
corporations to maximize their savings and earnings for more productivity, more em-
ployment, and higher economic growth. Hence, the contribution of this study is to
complement existing literature by investigating how increases in information-sharing
offices influence financial access when existing levels of development are considered in
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the modeling exercise. One of the main results stemming from the econometric ana-
lysis is that an increase in public credit registries improves financial efficiency in coun-
tries in the middle range of the financial development distribution. This result is
intuitive, because for poorly developed financial systems, increasing information-
sharing bureaus may in some respects decrease the pace of development, whereas for
more developed financial systems, the impact of information sharing may already have
been taken into account. It is important to note that some initial conditions (e.g. good
infrastructure, saving accounts for the majority of the population and high penetration
of information and communication technology) that are essential for information-
sharing bureaus to improve financial access may not be apparent in countries with
poorly developed financial systems.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the stylized facts,
theoretical underpinnings, and empirical literature. The data and methodology are cov-
ered in Section 3. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 concludes with future research directions.
Stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings, and empirical literature
Stylized facts
Information-sharing bureaus or credit reference agencies (private credit bureaus and/or
public credit registries) are institutions that collect information on the obligations of
commercial and individual borrowers from various sources, namely direct investigation
and public sources (for businesses), banks and credit card companies (for individuals),
and retail lenders (Tchamyou and Asongu 2017). Once the data are collected, the infor-
mation is consolidated after cross-checking to provide a comprehensive credit report.
Such a report is useful for potential creditors. Data from a credit history report can en-
compass both positive and negative information: (i) positive information (entailing de-
tails on all opened and closed credits and repayment behavior) and (ii) negative
information (which comprises default data for the most part).
Information-sharing bureaus are essential to enhance financial access in any econ-
omy, because they enable the mitigation of the information asymmetry that restricts
lenders from offering credit. On the one hand, adverse selection issues are attenuated
with information from credit histories. On the other, moral hazard issues are also con-
trolled by limiting default rates and increasing repayment rates. Ultimately, the incre-
mental volume in lending is essential for sectors with limited financial access like
micro, small, and medium corporations.
Prior to 2008, information-sharing bureaus were confined to a few countries in the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Latin America (see
Mylenko 2008). However, the growth of information and communication technology
has considerably increased the presence of such information credit offices in sub-
Saharan Africa, NorthAfrica, and Central and Eastern Europe. In sub-Saharan Africa,
with the exception of South Africa, very few countries possessed well-functioning
information-sharing bureaus before 2008. Some nations like Mozambique, Nigeria, and
Rwanda have instituted credit offices with the prime objective of boosting banking sec-
tor supervision. Greater articulation of controls is made on higher lending rates, and
due to lack of appropriate technology and incentives, such credit offices often did not
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provide timely and accurate information. Before 2008, numerous initiatives were imple-
mented throughout Africa in order to institute private credit bureaus, given demands
for data from supervising authorities to consolidate risk management practices on the
one hand, and from financial institutions on the other. In response, many countries in-
troduced information-sharing bureaus, including Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia.
Theoretical highlights
As documented by Claus and Grimes (2003), two principal strands exist in the theoretical
underpinnings of the literature on the linkage between financial intermediaries and infor-
mation sharing. The first strand investigates liquidity provision by financial institutions,
while the second focuses on the capacity of financial intermediaries to modify the risk
characteristics of assets. Both strands are founded on the essential economic role of finan-
cial intermediation, which is to augment efficiency in allocation by reducing the cost of
conveying mobilized deposits from depositors to borrowers. The theories underlying the
mission of financial intermediation are based on the literature of imperfect information in
the market. Accordingly, the primary task of financial intermediation is to reduce transac-
tion and information costs arising from information asymmetry between lenders and bor-
rowers. Therefore, the establishment of information-sharing bureaus is a channel through
which such information can be consolidated. These underpinnings are consistent with the
pioneering literature on the relevance of information sharing in financial intermediary
efficiency; most notably on models of credit rationing (see Williamson 1986; Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981; Jaffee and Russell 1976), ex-post and ex-ante information asymmetry (Dia-
mond and Dybvig 1983), communication on potential borrowers to investors by banks
(Leland and Pyle 1977), and diversification with financial intermediaries (Diamond 1984).
The association between information-sharing bureaus and financial access can be
seen from the view of adverse selection (from lenders) on the one hand and the per-
spective of moral hazard (from borrowers) on the other. Information-sharing agencies
provide lenders of financial institutions with borrower information and credit histories
that enable the reduction of substantial interest rates, which were the previous conse-
quence of adverse selection on the part of financial institutions. When borrowers are
granted credit, they automatically become liable to moral hazard, because their eco-
nomic activities related to granted credit could be concealed in order to reduce compli-
ance with their financial obligations towards the bank or lender. The responsibility
therefore falls on the credit bureaus to discipline borrowers on the severe consequences
of not complying with their periodic financial obligations. It is within this framework
that information-sharing bureaus reduce moral hazard in borrowers, essentially by edu-
cating them on the perils of debt defaults and resorting to the informal financial sector
as a sustainable alternative to the formal banking sector.
Empirical literature
A considerable bulk of the empirical studies on information sharing has been oriented
towards the impact of creditors’ rights to more data on the one hand and the impact of
reducing information asymmetry among creditors on the other. The former orientation
has for the most part focused on the influence that stronger creditors’ rights have on,
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inter alia: capital structure (El Ghoul et al. 2012); bankruptcy (Claessens and Klapper
2005; Djankov et al. 2007); and more risk-taking by financial institutions (Houston et
al. 2010; Acharya et al. 2011). This last orientation has revolved around investigating
how sharing information consolidates credit availability (Djankov et al. 2007; Brown et
al. 2009; Triki and Gajigo 2014), mitigates rates of default (Jappelli and Pagano 2002),
reduces credit cost (Brown et al. 2009), affects syndicated bank loans (Ivashina 2009;
Tanjung et al. 2010), impacts antitrust intervention (Coccorese 2012), and affects cor-
rupt lending (Barth et al. 2009).
The above literature indicates that inquiries have for the most part been dedicated to
developed countries, which have comparatively less severe barriers to financial access.
However, while a substantial body of studies has been oriented toward the Organisation
of Economic Cooperation countries, and on emerging nations in Asia and Latin America,
very little scholarly work has been devoted to Africa, a continent with substantially higher
constraints to financial access (Asongu et al. 2017).
Macroeconomic evidence on the influence of reducing information asymmetry has
been investigated by Galindo and Miller (2001), who concluded that developed coun-
tries with credit registries are associated with lower levels of financial restrictions in
comparison with their less developed counterparts with credit bureaus. Specifically,
public credit registries that are performing well contribute considerably to help reduce
the sensitivity of decisions in investment for “cash flow availability,” a characteristic
proxy for financial constraint.
A combination of private credit bureaus and public credit offices was employed by
Love and Mylenko (2003) with firm-based data from the World Bank Business Envir-
onment Survey. They investigated whether financial access constraints are negatively
related to credit registries. The findings show that private credit bureaus are linked to
higher financial access, whereas public credit registries have no significant impact on
decreasing constraints in financial access.
Barth et al. (2009) have investigated the effects of (i) information sharing and (ii) bor-
rower and lender competition on “lending corruption” through information-sharing
bureaus using the World Bank Business Environment Survey from 59 nations. The data
set consisted of 4000 corporations and private credit agencies in 129 nations. Two main
findings are established. First, corrupt lending is reduced by competition in banking
and by reducing information asymmetry. Second, competition among firms and the
legal environment have had a considerable effect on corrupt lending.
Triki and Gajigo (2014) investigated two principal issues, namely: (i) the impact of
information-sharing bureaus on corporations’ access to finance and (ii) the effect of the
design of public credit registries on the extent of constraints on financial access. The
following key findings are apparent. First, access to finance is comparatively greater in
countries with higher numbers of private credit bureaus relative to countries with pub-
lic credit registries or no information-sharing offices. Second, there is considerable het-
erogeneity in financial access and on the design of information-sharing bureaus with
public credit agencies.
Information-sharing thresholds were investigated by Asongu et al. (2016), who estab-
lished that information-sharing bureaus have negative effects on financial depth, with
the impact from public credit registries comparatively more noticeable. Private credit
bureaus have a higher negative impact on banking system efficiency, whereas public
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credit registries have an insignificant effect. Information-sharing bureaus have negative
effects on financial activity, with the impact from public credit registries being com-
paratively higher. The positive influence of private credit bureaus on financial size is
comparatively low.
Methods
Data
As outlined above, this study examines a panel of 53 African countries with data for
the period 2004–2011 from World Development Indicators and the Financial Develop-
ment and Structure Database of the World Bank. The periodicity is constrained by data
availability. Consistent with Asongu (2013), four financial development variables are
used, namely: depth, efficiency, activity, and size. First, financial depth embodies (i)
overall economic depth (M2/GDP)1 representing the monetary base plus demand, sav-
ings, and time deposits; and (ii) financial system deposits (Fdgdp). Distinguishing be-
tween these measures is important, because a substantial bulk of the monetary base in
developing nations does not circulate within the formal banking sector. Second, finan-
cial allocation efficiency measures the ability of financial intermediaries to transform
mobilized deposits into credit for economic agents. Two measurements of efficiency
are used, namely: (i) banking system efficiency (using “bank credit on bank deposits:
Bcbd”) and (ii) financial system efficiency (using “financial system credit on financial
system deposits: Fcfd”). Third, financial activity is measured as the ability of financial
institutions to provide credit to economic agents. Two indicators are also used for this
dimension of financial development, namely (i) banking system activity (with “private
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb”) and (ii) financial system activity (with “private
credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof”). Fourth, financial size
is the as the ratio of “deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (“deposit bank assets on cen-
tral bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba”). Note that financial ratios that are
dependent variables are mostly dimensions identified by the Financial Development
and Structure Database of the World Bank.
Consistent with recent information asymmetry literature, information-sharing bureaus
are measured by assessing public credit bureaus and private credit registries (Triki and
Gajigo 2014; Asongu et al. 2016). Asongu et al. (2016) have documented six distinguishing
characteristics between public credit bureaus and private credit registries, notably: pur-
pose, coverage, status, ownership, data sources used, and access. First, whereas private
credit registries are made up of public institutions that are constituted within the frame-
work of supervising the banking sector, public credit bureaus are created in response to
the need and demand for information on borrowers in the banking market. Hence, data
from private credit registries, usually employed to examine the creditworthiness of clients,
could also be acknowledged as a collateral benefit or by-product of private credit regis-
tries. Second, while the coverage engendered by private credit registries is restricted in
terms of information (or data) type and history provided, public credit bureaus extend be-
yond the scope of large corporations and include small and medium size enterprises
(SMEs) that are characterized by richer data and longer histories. Third, whereas public
credit bureaus are fundamentally established for profit making, private credit registries are
not primarily focused on profits. Fourth, on the issue of ownership, whereas public
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credit registries belong to governments and/or central banks, the ownership of pri-
vate credit bureaus revolve outside highlighted establishments (central banks and
governments) to include lenders, lenders’ associates, and independent third parties.
Fifth, while the data used by private credit registries are sourced from non-bank
and bank financial establishments, data from public credit bureaus entails private
credit registries, tax authorities, courts and utilities, to sources employed by private
credit registries for information. Sixth, access to private credit registries (public
credit bureaus) is restricted to providers of information (open to all lender types).
The control variables are also consistent with the recent information asymmetry literature
(Asongu et al. 2016), namely, inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade, and foreign
aid. The selected covariates have also been substantially documented in the financial devel-
opment literature (Osabuohien and Efobi 2013; Huang 2005; Asongu 2014b; Asongu 2015).
First, foreign aid like remittances (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Efobi et al. 2015) could in-
crease financial development if it is not associated with activities that decrease its flow
within a country, such as funds captured by developed countries for consultancy ser-
vices and deposited by corrupt officials from developing countries in tax havens that
are under the jurisdictions of developed countries.
Second, there is an abundance of literature that has established a positive growth-
finance relationship (see Saint Paul 1992; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Owusu and
Odhiambo 2014; Nyasha and Odhiambo 2015a, b). According to these studies, eco-
nomic growth is linked to decreasing costs in financial intermediation, which is the
outcome of higher compensation that entails growing the financial resources devoted
to investment. Moreover, the importance of income levels in financial development has
been established in both broad (Levine 1997) and Africa-specific (Asongu 2012) studies.
Whereas Asongu has shown that countries with high income are linked to greater fi-
nancial development levels in Africa, Jaffee and Levonian (2001) concluded that higher-
income countries are associated with more developed banking system structures. The
engaged narrative needs to balance the fact that growth may be linked to financial cri-
ses that ultimately reduce financial development (Asongu et al. 2016).
Third, there is a branch of the literature sympathetic to the perspective that policies
that are friendly to openness (like trade) are positively linked to financial development
(see Huang and Temple 2005; Do and Levchenko 2004).
Fourth, the nexus between investment and financial development has been assessed
by Huang (2011), who found a positive connection.
Fifth, some main domestic macroeconomic policies, such as the maintenance of
stable and/or low inflation levels, are needed for financial development (Huang,
2011; Boyd et al. 2001; Huybens and Smith 1999). Accordingly, Huybens and Smith
(1999) and Boyd et al. (2001) have respectively shown theoretically and empirically
that nations with chaotic and/or high inflation are very likely to be associated with
smaller, less efficient, and less active financial institutions.
It is important to note that the expected signs of covariates cannot be established
without uncertainty, because the corresponding financial development variables conflict
in terms of definition and measurement. For example, financial efficiency is measured
as the ratio of financial activity (credit) to financial depth (deposits). The definitions
and sources of the variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in
Appendix 2, and the correlation matrix in Appendix 3.
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Methodology
Consistent with the research question, which is to assess the existing financial development
levels for which the influence of information-sharing offices on financial access matters, the
study accounts for the existing levels of financial development by employing a quantile re-
gression estimation technique that has been documented to account for initial levels in
dependent variables (see Billger and Goel 2009; Okada and Samreth 2012; Asongu and
Nwachukwu 2017) with information-sharing bureaus being examined throughout the con-
ditional distributions of the outcome variable (Koenker and Hallock 2001).
Previous literature on information sharing has examined the relationship between
information-sharing bureaus and financial development by engaging parameter esti-
mates at the conditional mean of the financial development variables (Triki and Gajigo
2014; Asongu et al. 2016). Whereas mean impacts are relevant, the underlying litera-
ture is extended by employing quantile regressions that distinguish existing levels of fi-
nancial access. Furthermore, while ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are based
on the hypothesis that financial access variables and error terms are normally distrib-
uted, such an assumption of error terms that are normally distributed does not hold
with quantile regressions.
The quantile regression models parameter estimates at numerous points of the condi-
tional distribution of financial access. Therefore, the technique is in conformity with
the motivation of distinguishing between nations with high, intermediate, and low ini-
tial levels of financial development.
The θth quantile estimator of a financial access variable is derived by solving the
optimization problem in Eq. (1), which is shown without subscripts for simplicity and
ease of presentation.
min
β∈Rk
X
i∈ i:yi≥xi
0
βf g
θ yi−xi
0
β
 þ
X
i∈ i:yi<xi
0
βf g
1−θð Þ yi−xi
0
β
 
2
64
3
75 ð1Þ
where θ∈(0,1). As opposed to OLS, which is fundamentally based on minimizing the
sum of squared residuals, with quantile regressions the weighted sum of the absolute
deviations is minimized. For instance, the 25th or 75th quartiles (with θ = 0.25 or 0.75
respectively) are estimated by approximately weighting the residuals. The conditional
quintile of financial development or yi given xi is:
Qy θ=xið Þ ¼ xi 0βo ð2Þ
where unique slope parameters are modeled for each θth specific quintile. This
formulation is analogous to E(y/x) = xi′β in the OLS slope, where parameters are
investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of financial develop-
ment. For the model in Eq. (2), the dependent variable yi is a financial develop-
ment indicator, while xi contains a constant term, foreign aid, trade, GDP growth,
public investment, and inflation. As specified in Eq. (2), the linearity in quantiles is
appropriate under the assumption of homoscedasticity. This is essentially because
if there is heteroscedasticity in the error process, then the quantiles will possess
nonlinearities of different degrees.
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Results and Discussion
Financial development and public credit registries
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively disclose results corresponding to financial depth, fi-
nancial allocation efficiency, financial activity, and financial size. Irrespective of tables,
the left-handside (LHS) presents contemporary estimations, whereas the right-handside
(RHS) presents non-contemporary estimations. The motivation for lagging the inde-
pendent variables on the RHS by one year is to account for endogeneity (see Mlachila
et al. 2014; Asongu et al. 2016). The consistent variations in information-sharing esti-
mates between OLS and quantile regressions (with respect to sign, significance, and
magnitude of significance) is a justification for the relevance of the problem statement,
notably investigating the impact of increasing information-sharing offices on financial
development where existing levels of financial development matter.
The findings are explained at three levels, namely, in terms of marginal effect, net ef-
fect, and thresholds. The net effect of increasing public credit registries in the 0.10th
quintile on the LHS of Table 1 is computed with conditional and unconditional effects
of public credit registries. Accordingly, the marginal or conditional effect (from the
interaction) is 0.052, while the unconditional impact of public credit registries is
−0.945. Hence, the corresponding net effect of increasing public credit registries is
−0.832 ([2.155 × 0.052] + −0.945)2. Given that the conditional or marginal impact is
positive, the corresponding threshold in public credit registries at which the negative
unconditional effect changes from negative to positive is 18.173 (0.945/0.052). The
positive threshold is feasible, because it is within the public credit registries’ range
(minimum to maximum) as disclosed by the summary statistics (0.00 to 49.80).
It is important to note that whereas the computation of net effects requires statistically
significant unconditional and conditional effects, a threshold may be apparent even when
only the conditional effect is significant. Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2017), the
notion of threshold is in accordance with Cummins (2000) on the minimum level/thresh-
old in language proficiency before rewards are acquired in a second language. In addition,
the definition of threshold is also supported by the critical mass theory, which has been
abundantly documented in the literature on economic development (see Roller and
Waverman 2001; Ashraf and Galor 2013). A recent application of the threshold or critical
mass theory based on interaction variables can be found in Batuo (2015). Therefore, from
the perspective of this study, the concept of threshold is not different from: (i) the mini-
mum requirement for the reaping of positive effects (Cummins 2000); (ii) conditions for
U-shape and inverted U-shape dynamics (Ashraf and Galor 2013) and (iii) critical mass
for positive impacts (Roller and Waverman 2001; Batuo 2015).
Two key results can be established from Table 1 on linkages between financial depth
and public credit registries. First, in Panel A on money supply, (i) there are positive
thresholds (from contemporary and noncontemporary regressions) in the 10th decile
with corresponding negative net effects; and (ii) there is a synergy effect in the 25th
quartile on the LHS. It is important to note that threshold values and net effects are
disclosed at the bottom of the panels. Second, in Panel B, most significant results are
apparent between the 10th decile and 50th quartile with (i) both negative (positive) net
effects in the 10th (25th) decile (quartile) and (ii) both positive and synergy effects in
the 10th decile and 25th quartile and consistent synergy impacts in the 50th quartile.
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on linkages between financial effi-
ciency and public credit registries. In Panel A (on banking system efficiency) and Panel B
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(on financial system efficiency), most of the significant estimates are between the 25th and
75th quartiles, with positive net effects and negative thresholds that are not within range.
The main outcome from Table 3 on linkages between financial activity and public credit
registries is shown in Panel A (on banking system activity) and Panel B (on financial system
activity). It is noteworthy that most of the significant estimates are between the 25th and
75th quartiles, with positive net effects and negative thresholds that are not within range.
In Table 4 on the connections between financial size and public credit registries, most
of the significant estimates are between the 25th and 75th quartiles, with positive net
effects and negative thresholds that are not within range.
Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. It is important to note
that some of the signs may vary from one table to another, because the financial develop-
ment variables are by definition inconsistent. The financial development variable of Table
2 (financial efficiency) is the ratio of the financial development variable in Table 3 (finan-
cial credit) to the financial development variable in Table 1 (financial deposits).
Financial development and private credit bureaus
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively disclose results corresponding to financial depth, financial
allocation efficiency, financial activity, and financial size. Irrespective of tables, the left-hand
side (LHS) presents contemporary estimations whereas the right-hand side (RHS) presents
non-contemporary estimations. Contrary to the findings in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 on public
credit registries, the marginal, threshold, and net effects of private credit bureaus in Tables
5, 6, 7 and 8 are not clearly apparent. In order to examine why findings corresponding to
private credit bureaus are not significant, we assess country-specific averages of
information-sharing offices, which we disclosed in Appendix 4. From these country-specific
averages, we can reasonably infer that the findings on private credit bureaus are not very
significant because of issues in degrees of freedom. Hence, the concluding implications that
follow are essentially based on findings connected to public credit registries.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to investigate how increases in information-sharing bureaus
affect financial access. For this purpose, we employ contemporary and noncontemporary
interactive quantile regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011.
Information-sharing bureaus are proxied by public credit registries and private credit bur-
eaus. Financial development dynamics associated with depth (at overall economic and finan-
cial system levels), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking
and financial system perspectives), and size are used. The following findings were established.
First, the incidence of increasing private credit bureaus is not very apparent on financial
access, probably because private credit bureaus are still to be established in many countries.
Second, an increase in public credit registries improves financial allocation efficiency and ac-
tivity (or credit) between the 25th and 75th quartiles for the most part. This result is intui-
tive, because for poorly developed financial systems, an increase in information-sharing
bureaus may in some cases decrease the pace of development, whereas for more developed
financial systems, information sharing may already have been taken into account.
As a main policy implication, countries in the top (or highest levels of financial develop-
ment) and bottom (or lowest levels of financial development) ends of the financial efficiency
Asongu and Nwachukwu Financial Innovation  (2017) 3:11 Page 17 of 30
and activity distributions are unlikely to benefit from enhanced financial allocation efficiency
owing to an increase inpublic credit registries. While the absence of positive net effects in
the top quantiles may be traced to diseconomies of scale in public credit registries, the ab-
sence of positive net impacts in the bottom quantiles could be traceable to the fact that cer-
tain levels of financial efficiency and activity are required before the benefits of an increase
in public credit registries can be achieved in terms of increasing financial access.
On the relationship between established findings and the literature, two angles are ap-
parent. On the one hand, the findings are broadly consistent with those of Singh et al.
(2009), who found that African countries with information-sharing mechanisms for banks
are associated with higher levels of financial development. The findings are also aligned
with those of Galindo and Miller (2001) in the view that credit registries are more likely
to enhance financial development compared with credit bureaus in less-developed coun-
tries. On the other hand, our results appear not to be broadly in line with those of Love
and Mylenko (2003), who argued that whereas the presence of private registries is associ-
ated with a higher share of bank lending and lower constraints on finance, public regis-
tries do not have a significant effect on financing constraints. Our results also do not align
with those of Triki and Gajigo (2014), who concluded that private credit bureaus are more
positively sensitive to finance access, compared with public credit registries. Asongu et al.
(2016) found that information-sharing offices negatively affect financial access for the
most part, while Asongu et al. (2017) concluded that financial development dynamics re-
spond more positively to private credit bureaus relative to public credit registries.
There are three main shortcomings that merit emphasis. First, we have not reported
quantile regression coefficients with which to substantiate the analysis in the study. Ac-
cordingly, we adopted a minimalist approach in the interpretation of estimated coeffi-
cients. The minimalist approach is based on the understanding that net effects are
computed from corresponding significant estimated coefficients and policy inferences
are based on net effects. The tables and regressions proliferate very rapidly, and corre-
sponding combinations of “tests of equality of quantile regression coefficients” substan-
tially increase the number of tables we have to produce. Second, measurement error
can typically be worse in panel data models. Third, while we have used lagged values of
the regressors in order to have some “bite” on endogeneity, there are more formal ap-
proaches such as instrumentation with lagged values. This implies that the quantile re-
gressions with contemporaneous regressors are even more likely to be affected by
simultaneity bias. We have maintained both contemporary and non-contemporary re-
gressions, because both are still affected by simultaneity bias.
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing how the established
findings can be improved with information and communication technologies. More-
over, investigating how countries at the top and bottom ends of the financial access dis-
tributions can benefit from an increase in public credit registries is also worthwhile. A
more robust quantile estimator with which to investigate these suggested lines of
inquiry is proposed by Canay (2011). This estimator considers country-specific hetero-
geneity that is ignored in the current analysis.
Endnotes
1M2 equals Money Supply.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Table 9 Summary statistics (2004–2011)
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Financial Development Economic Financial Depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp) 28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377
Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379
Financial Size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399
Information Asymmetry Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380
Control Variables Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 −17.66 37.998 404
Inflation 7.801 4.720 0 43.011 357
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 −8.974 24,411 387
Development Assistance 10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392
S.D standard deviation, Min minimum, Max maximum, M2 money supply, Fdgdp financial deposits(liquid liabilities), BcBd
bank credit on Bank deposits, FcFd financial credit on Financial deposits, Pcrb private domestic credit from deposit banks,
Pcrbof private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions, Dbacba deposit bank assets on central
bank assets plus deposit bank assets, GDPg GDP growth
Table 10 Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size: 291)
Financial Development Dynamics
Info.
Asymmetry
Other variables
Financial
Depth
Financial
Efficiency
Financial
Activity
Fin. Size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade
1.000 0.970 0.094 0.103 0.821 0.629 0.398 0.416 0.147 −0.104 −0.080 0.055 −0.295 0.140 M2
1.000 0.130 0.220 0.886 0.754 0.452 0.409 0.303 −0.091 −0.063 0.070 −0.320 0.149 Fdgdp
1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.243 0.154 0.303 −0.016 −0.144 −0.169 −0.133 −0.176 Bcbd
1.000 0.583 0.743 0.242 0.067 0.510 −0.056 −0.097 −0.149 −0.179 −0.189 FcFd
1.000 0.922 0.478 0.448 0.439 −0.092 −0.089 −0.055 −0.343 0.093 Pcrb
1.000 0.413 0.293 0.556 −0.088 −0.073 −0.057 −0.324 0.019 Pcrbof
1.000 0.249 0.343 −0.061 −0.142 0.198 −0.403 0.210 Dbacba
1.000 −0.140 −0.026 −0.081 0.068 −0.154 0.207 PCR
1.000 −0.101 −0.035 −0.047 −0.329 0.084 PCB
1.000 −0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg
1.000 −0.081 −0.0004 −0.006 Inflation
1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt
1.000 −0.309 NODA
1.000 Trade
M2 Money Supply, Fdgdp financial deposits(liquid liabilities), BcBd bank credit on bank deposits, FcFd financial credit on Financial
deposits, Pcrb private domestic credit from deposit banks
Pcrbof private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions, Dbacba deposit bank assets on central bank
assets plus deposit bank assets, Info information, PCR public credit Registries
PCB Private Credit Bureaus, GDPg GDP growth, Popg population growth, PubIvt Public Investment, NODA Net Official Development
Assistance, Info information
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Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Table 11 Definitions of variables
Variables Signs Definitions of variables Sources
Economic Financial Depth M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Financial System Depth Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Banking System Efficiency BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD)
Financial System Efficiency FcFd Financial credit on Financial
deposits
World Bank (FDSD)
Banking System Activity Prcb Private domestic credit from
deposit banks (% of GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from
financial institutions (% of GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial Size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central
bank assets plus Deposit bank assets
World Bank (FDSD)
Information Asymmetry PCR Public credit registry coverage
(% of adults)
World Bank (WDI)
PCB Private credit bureau coverage
(% of adults)
World Bank (WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI)
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI)
Public Investment PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
Development Assistance NODA Total Net Official Development
Assistance (% of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)
Trade openness Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities
(% of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)
WDI World Bank Development Indicators, FDSD Financial Development and Structure Database
Table 12 Country-specific average values from information sharing bureaus
Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000
2) Angola 2.412 0.000
3) Benin 8.037 0.000
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000
9) Central African Republic 1.412 0.000
10) Chad 0.400 0.000
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000
14) Côte d’Ivoire 2.487 0.000
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000
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Table 12 Country-specific average values from information sharing bureaus (Continued)
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000
19) Ethiopia 0.087 0.000
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000
27) Liberia 0.280 0.000
28) Libya na na
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000
31) Mali 2.812 0.000
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000
33) Mauritius 27.866 0.000
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362
37) Niger 0.825 0.000
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000
44) Somalia na na
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000
49) Togo 2.550 0.000
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512
52) Zambia 0.000 0.975
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000
na not applicable because of missing observations
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